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Abstract—The Function-as-a-Service (FaaS) paradigm has a
lot of potential as a computing model for fog environments
comprising both cloud and edge nodes. When the request rate
exceeds capacity limits at the edge, some functions need to be
offloaded from the edge towards the cloud.
In this position paper, we propose an auction-based approach
in which application developers bid on resources. This allows fog
nodes to make a local decision about which functions to offload
while maximizing revenue. For a first evaluation of our approach,
we use simulation.
Index Terms—Serverless Computing, Function-as-a-Service,
Fog Computing
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, the paradigm of fog computing has received more
and more attention. In fog computing, cloud resources are
combined with resources at the edge, i.e., near the end user or
close to IoT devices, and in some cases also with additional
resources in the network between cloud and edge [1]. While
this adds extra complexity for applications, it also comes with
three key benefits: First, leveraging compute resources at or
near the edge promises lower response times which is crucial
for application domains such as autonomous driving or 5G
mobile networks [1], [2]. Second, data can be filtered and
pre-processed early on the path from edge to the cloud which
reduces the data volume [3]. Especially in IoT use cases, it is
often not feasible to transmit all data to the cloud as the sheer
volume of produced data exceeds the bandwidth capabilities
of the network [4]. Third, keeping parts of applications and
data at the edge can help to improve privacy, e.g., by avoiding
centralized data lakes in the cloud [1], [5], [6]. Overall, fog
computing, thus, combines the benefits of both cloud and edge
computing.
While there are many open research questions in fog com-
puting, a key question has not been answered yet: Which
compute paradigms will future fog applications follow? In
previous work [1], we argued that a serverless approach –
under which we understand Function-as-a-Service (FaaS) –
will be a good fit for the edge. Our reasoning for this is
that resources at the edge are often very limited so that
provisioning them in small function slices is much more
efficient than provisioning them as virtual machines or long-
running containers. Additionally, the idea of having strictly
stateless functions separated from data management [7], [8] is
also a key requirement for easily moving parts of applications
between edge and cloud.
Now, assuming a fully serverless world in which application
components run as functions on FaaS platforms in the cloud,
at the edge, and possibly in medium-sized data centers in the
network in between, the question of how to distribute fog
application components can be reduced to the issue of function
placement across multiple geo-distributed sites. In this position
paper, we propose an approach for this kind of function
placement. Hence, we make the following contributions:
1) We describe an approach that uses a decentralized auc-
tion scheme to control function placement (section III).
2) We present a simulation tool and the underlying system
model that allows to study the effects of different pa-
rameters on such an auction-based placement approach
(section IV).
3) We discuss a number of insights gained from simulation
runs (section V).
4) We identify and discuss future research directions (sec-
tion VI).
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we will briefly introduce and describe our
understanding of FaaS, fog computing, and auctions. The
remainder of this paper will be based on this terminology.
A. Function-as-a-Service (FaaS)
For our purposes, FaaS is a simple (cloud) service model
in which application developers deploy the code of a sin-
gle function on an execution platform. The platform directs
incoming requests to that function, auto-scales the function
“executor” (often Docker containers) as needed, and bills
the developers based on actual usage. Key characteristics are
stateless functions leveraging external services, particularly
storage, with limited execution durations. This corresponds to
the service models of, e.g., AWS Lambda1 or OpenWhisk [7].
B. Fog Computing
There are multiple competing definitions for the term “fog
computing”. Sometimes, it is used as a synonym for edge
computing, sometimes it is used to refer to compute resources
between edge and cloud, and sometimes it is used to refer to
everything beyond the cloud (possibly including it) down to
(embedded) device level. For our purposes, we will follow the
1aws.amazon.com/lambda
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Fig. 1. Overview of Cloud, Edge, and Fog Computing (adapted from [1])
definition of [1], i.e., fog computing comprises resources at the
edge, in the cloud, and all resources in the network between
edge and cloud. To the latter, we refer to as “intermediary
nodes” or short “intermediary”. In a mobile network scenario,
“the edge” would be compute resources that are collocated
with the cellular towers, “the cloud” would be the offerings
of providers such as AWS2, and “intermediaries” would be
small- to medium-sized data centers within the network of the
Internet provider.
C. Fog-Based FaaS Platforms
Beyond commercial FaaS platforms provided as cloud ser-
vice, e.g., AWS Lambda or IBM Cloud Functions3, systems
such as OpenWhisk [7] (the system behind IBM Cloud
Functions) or OpenLambda [9] have been made available
as open source. For a fog deployment, such systems are a
good fit for cloud nodes but also for larger intermediary
nodes. Moreover, there is LeanOpenWhisk4 which is a good
fit for intermediary or larger edge nodes. As we have seen
in experiments, LeanOpenWhisk is not yet “lean” enough
for smaller edge nodes such as a single machine or even a
Raspberry Pi; tinyFaaS [10] can be an alternative for smaller
edge nodes. Overall, this shows that the necessary systems for
deployment in the fog already exist as open source (or will be
there shortly).
D. Auctions
Auction is a way to sell a commodity at some price that
is determined through the competition among potential buyers
(bidders). The seller (auctioneer) sets the auction’s rule, which
can be roughly written as the pair (R,P ), with R being the
allocation rule that determines the winner among the bidders,
and P being the payment rule that describes the price every
participant has to pay to the seller.
While competing, the bidders have to follow the auction’s
rules set by the seller (auctioneer). There is a large body of
auction rules. This includes, but is not limited to
• First/Second-price Sealed-bid Auction: The object is
awarded to the highest bidder, at the price of its bid (first-
price) or the bid of the second-highest bidder (second-
price), which ensures truthful bids.
2aws.amazon.com
3cloud.ibm.com/functions
4github.com/kpavel/incubator-openwhisk/tree/lean
• English Auction: The price is raised continuously by the
bidders. The winner is the last bidder to remain and pays
an amount equal to the price at which all other bidders
have dropped out of the auction.
• Dutch Auction: An initial price is set, and it is lowered
continuously by the auctioneer. The winner is the first
bidder to agree to pay any price.
• All-Pay Auction: All bidders submit bids, and the high
bidder wins, but every bidder has to pay its bid.
• Penny Auction: The price is raised continuously by the
auctioneer, and the winner pays the current bid. But every
bidder pays for all bids along the way, i.e., bidding costs
something.
In designing and evaluating the auction rule, the desiderata are
vast. One of the most important characteristics is truthfulness
or incentive-compatibility, which means that for each bidder
the best strategy is to bid its value regardless of the strategies
of other bidders. Other factors include revenue, participation,
or fairness.
III. AUCTION-BASED FUNCTION PLACEMENT
While a number of FaaS systems is already available, as
discussed in section II-A, it is still not clear how to connect
different FaaS deployments. Ideally, we would want edge,
intermediary, and cloud deployments to coordinate function
placement among each other. For instance, a request arriving
in the cloud should probably still be processed in the cloud.
A request arriving at the edge, however, should in most
cases (exceptions include functions that require data located
elsewhere [8]) be executed right at the edge. Only when the
load on the edge node exceeds the available capacity should
the request be delegated to the intermediary (and likewise from
the intermediary to the cloud). This concept, similar to cloud
bursting, is based on the intuition of the cloud providing (the
illusion of) infinite resources [11].
Based on this, we can conclude that function placement is
straightforward when nodes have spare capacity (see also [3]
for a more general discussion) but becomes challenging when,
for instance, an edge node is overloaded. In such a situation,
the question is which request should be delegated to the next
node on the path to the cloud as that request will incur extra
latency. For this decision, we can imagine a number of criteria,
e.g., to prefer short-running functions over long-running ones
(and vice versa), to consider bandwidth impacts, to give some
clients preference over others, or to prefer latency-critical
functions over less critical ones.
In contrast to these, we propose to use an auction-based ap-
proach which has been proven in multiple domains (e.g., [12]–
[19]) to lead to an efficient resource allocation: When applica-
tion developers deploy their function to an integrated fog FaaS
platform, they also attach two bids to the executable. The first
bid is the price that the respective developer is willing to pay
for a node to store the executable (in $/s), the second bid is
for the execution of the function (in $/execution). In practice,
both bids are likely to be vectors so that developers could
indicate their willingness to pay more on edge nodes than
in the cloud or even on a specific edge node. We explicitly
distinguish bids for storage of the executable and the execution
as edge nodes might encounter storage limits independent from
processing limits. Both auctions closely resemble a sequence
of first-price sealed-bid auctions discussed in section II-D.
Please note two things: (i) In practice, a second-price auction
would be preferable. For ease of explanation, however, we
use the first-price auction in the following as it makes no
difference in our examples. (ii) As there is likely to be a
minimum price equivalent to today’s cloud prices, we consider
both bids a surcharge on top of the regular cloud price. For
ease of explanation, we again ignore this base price in the
following.
Storage Bids: The nodes in our approach – edge, inter-
mediaries, and cloud – analyze these bids and can make a
local decision, i.e., act as auctioneers, which is important for
overall scalability. We assume that cloud nodes will accept
all bids that exceed some minimum price (see the discussion
of base prices above). All other nodes will check whether
they can store the executable. When there is enough remaining
capacity, nodes simply store the executable together with the
attached bids and start charging the application based on the
storage bid. When there is not enough disk space left, nodes
decide whether they want to reject the bid or remove another
already stored executable. For this, nodes try to maximize
their earnings. A very simple strategy for this, comparable
to standard bin packing, is to order all executables by their
storage bid (either the absolute bid or the bid divided by the
size of the executable) and keep removing executables until
the new one fits in. Of course, arbitrary complex strategies
can be used and could even consider the processing bid and
the expected number of executions. In the end, this leads to
a situation where some or all nodes will store the executable
along with its bids.
Processing Bids: When a request arrives, nodes have to
decide whether they want to process said request. A node can
process a request when it stores the corresponding executable
and when it has sufficient processing capacity to execute the
function. We can imagine arbitrarily complex schemes for
making the decision on whether to execute the request or not.
For instance, nodes might try to predict future requests (and
decide to wait for a more lucrative one) or they might try
to queue a request shortly – all with the goal of maximizing
earnings. In fact, we believe that this opens interesting oppor-
tunities for future work.
For the explanations in this paper, we will assume that a
node will decide to process a request as soon as it is capable
of doing so. This means that upon receipt of a set of incoming
requests, a node will follow these four steps:
1) Reject all requests for which the executable is not stored
locally.
2) Sort remaining requests by their bid (highest first) into
a request list.
3) While capacity is left, schedule requests from request
list.
4) Reject all requests that exceed the capacity.
Rejected requests are then pushed to the next node on
the path to the cloud. As the cloud stores by definition
all executables and has for all practical purposes unlimited
capacity, all requests will at least be served in the cloud.
Overall, this approach solves the question of function allo-
cation, all functions are executed as close as possible to the
edge; under high load, it will also have the effect that prices
increase towards the edge. Of course, it is possible to identify
scenarios where this simple allocation scheme leads to the
opposite effect. For instance, when long-running requests with
low bids are directly followed by requests with high bids, the
overall result may well be that all high-bid requests are served
in the cloud. This, however, is a corner case scenario and we
leave the identification of both optimal bidding strategies as
well as optimal node decision rules for future work.
IV. MODEL AND SIMULATION APPROACH
To evaluate our approach, we have implemented a simu-
lation tool in Kotlin which is available on GitHub5. In the
tool, we distinguish three types of nodes: edge, intermediary,
and cloud. All three node types have a distinct storage and
processing capacity, we assume that all requests get the
same compute power but may take arbitrarily long, i.e., the
processing capacity is specified as the number of requests
which can be handled in parallel. All nodes treat bids in the
way described in section III. The only difference is that a
simulation run has a fixed duration in time units: if a non-
cloud node cannot complete a request before the simulation
ends, it will also push it towards the cloud. For future research
on different auction strategies, it is only necessary to change
the methods offerExecutable and offerRequests in
ComputeNode.kt which implement the respective allocation
rules (see section II).
Beyond the parameters already mentioned, users can specify
the node setup (number and type of nodes and their inter-
connection), average latency for request execution as well
as latency between edge and intermediary or intermediary
and cloud, average storage and processing bids, number and
average size of executables, and the number of requests that
should arrive at each edge node. While the simulation tool
can handle more diverse configurations in its calculations,
we recommend to stick with a few standard settings so that
users only need to modify a configuration object (Config in
Simulator.kt). In these settings, we make the assumption that
all requests will arrive at the edge and that there are at least one
edge, intermediary, and cloud node each. Our implementation
also assumes that bids are identical across all node types.
To support reproducibility of simulation runs, the tool ex-
plicitly sets the random seed; parameters specified as average
X follow a uniform distribution over a specified range.
V. INSIGHTS FROM SIMULATION
In this section, we describe insights we gained from simu-
lation. Namely, we ran two different simulation experiments:
5https://github.com/dbermbach/faas4fogsim
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Fig. 3. Experiment 1: Overall Request Latency under Varying Load
The first analyzed the effect of processing prices on function
placement and latency depending on the request load. The sec-
ond studied the effect of storage prices on function placement
and latency depending on the demand for storage.
A. Configuration
For both simulation experiments, we had one edge, in-
termediary, and cloud node and simulated a period of two
minutes; we also set the average processing latency as 30ms,
the average edge to intermediary latency as 20ms, and the
average intermediary to cloud latency as 40ms.
In the first experiment, we chose storage parameters in
a way that they would not influence the experiment at all
and only limited the processing capabilities on the edge and
the intermediary. In our parameter settings, anything up to
166req/s could on average be handled at the edge and any-
thing up to an average of 832req/s at edge and intermediary.
Anything beyond this required the cloud to handle the load.
Each request had a random processing bid from the interval
[50;150] (uniformly distributed). We repeated this experiment
with varying request load: from 100 to 2000req/s in steps
of 100. Our experiment, thus, simulated 12,000 to 240,000
requests. We also ran a single simulation round for 5000req/s
to verify trends.
In the second experiment, we chose processing parameters
that should not affect the simulation result. Edge nodes had
a storage capacity of 100, intermediaries of 500, and the
cloud was unlimited; the average size of an executable was
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10 and came with random storage bids from the interval
[50;150] (uniformly distributed). We repeated this experiment
with varying numbers of executables starting with 5 (which
on average should still all fit in the edge node), over 50
(on average edge nodes store 20% of all executables and
intermediaries still store all of them), up to 100 in steps of
5. For all other parameters, we chose sensible settings that
were identical in both experiments; the precise settings can be
found in the GitHub repository of our tool.
B. Experiment 1: Effect of Processing Prices
As can be seen in figures 2 and 3, the simulated system
is lightly loaded up to about 500req/s. Here, the random
distribution of request generation plays a much bigger role
than the auction mechanism. For the earnings, we can see in
figure 2 that the average price for executing a function at the
edge gradually increases. For the intermediary it also increases
continuously (from 98.3 at 100req/s to 99.8 at 2000 req/s) but
at a much smaller scale since the edge is not yet overloaded
enough to delegate requests with higher bids. The price range
for bids is capped at 150 so that the edge is already fairly close
to this maximum at 5000req/s. For latency, we can see that
it linearly increases with the load as more and more requests
(the lower paying ones) are no longer served on the edge but
rather delegated to intermediary and cloud.
Overall, this experiment shows that even the simplistic
auction scheme that we chose is indeed an efficient mechanism
to handle function allocation across fog nodes with the goal
of determining the placement based on payment preferences
of application developers.
C. Experiment 2: Effect of Storage Prices
As can be seen in figure 4, which shows the average storage
price of all executables stored on a node, the edge does not
have any choice of executables when only five are offered.
Likewise, the intermediary only starts to evict executables
once it exceeds its capacity of about 50. Afterwards, both
curves gradually increase towards the upper limit of 150
which, however, is not reached in this experiment as the
randomization means that only very few executables will be
offered at a storage bid of 150. In addition, the average storage
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Fig. 5. Experiment 2: Overall Request Latency at Varying Availability of
Function Executables
price in the cloud is about 100 which is as expected as the
cloud accepts all executables in our simulation setting.
Figure 5, in contrast, shows how this leads to increasing
latency across requests: With every additional executable,
the share of executables available at the edge (or on the
intermediary) decreases so that requests are increasingly del-
egated towards the cloud since the function can, without an
executable, not be run.
Overall, this experiment shows that our auction-based ap-
proach is an efficient mechanism to determine distribution of
binaries across a fog network when there is a lack of storage
capacity.
VI. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
With our simulation model, we showed that it is indeed
feasible to address function placement for fog-based FaaS
platforms based on distributed auctions. In our approach,
however, the bids and the auction rules follow a rather
simplistic approach. We believe that this opens up interesting
opportunities for future research:
First, application developers could specify bids in a more
intelligent way, considering the location of edge nodes and
their clients as well as availability of resources, i.e., they
should provide high bids for scarce resources that are urgently
needed while offering low bids, e.g., for processing and storage
in the cloud. This also opens up a few game-theoretic questions
about combinations of storage and processing bids, e.g., to use
a high storage bid with a bloated executable to get a single
tenant edge node combined with a very low processing bid to
reduce cost.
Second, our current nodes are rather simplistic in that they
do not look into the future and do not couple storage and
processing bid – they simply accept all executables that fit in
and serve whatever comes in ordered by the bids. While this is
in line with the chosen auction model, much higher revenue
could be achieved based on more intelligent decisions. For
instance, just considering the processing bid as well as past
invocation numbers coupled with the storage bid would result
in more profitable situations. As another example, it may make
sense to delegate a processing request even though the node is
not saturated when a periodic request with a higher processing
cost is expected to arrive shortly.
Combining both aspects, significant efficiency improve-
ments are possible when application developers try to mini-
mize cost while nodes try to maximize earnings. Beyond this,
there are of course a number of technical challenges in im-
plementing such an integrated platform, e.g., for dealing with
failures. We believe that both the game-theoretic challenges as
well as the systems challenges are worthy of further research
attention. Finally, there is also the aspect of co-managing data
placement [4], [20]–[22] and function placement [3], [23], [24]
which is a promising avenue to pursue [8], [25].
Beyond this, our approach obviously takes a rather particu-
lar approach as application developers will get no guarantees
at all where their function will be executed – the placement
of functions only depends on the amount of the bids at a
specific point in time. There is, hence, no way to guarantee
bounds on response time and other quality dimensions, i.e., the
infrastructure provider does not provide any guarantees beyond
eventually executing every function somewhere. In a way, this
is comparable to airline seat assignment schemes in which
economy class passengers can bid for business class upgrades.
While this is undesirable from an application developer per-
spective, our proposed approach has the benefit that it requires
no centralized coordination at all, i.e., it scales well, and that it
is likely to maximize earnings for the infrastructure provider.
Also, the lack of guarantees is perfectly inline with the state-
of-practice in current cloud services which provide minimal to
no guarantees at all as part of their SLAs [26]. Nevertheless, if
our proposed approach were used in practice, we would expect
infrastructure providers to let customers reserve subsets of
their resources at a fixed price – comparable to 5G slicing [27]
– hence using the proposed auctioning scheme only for a
subset of their resources. This would lead to the interesting
situation that application developers that actually need quality
guarantees can pay for it (comparable to booking a business
class seat) while others can still bid on the remaining resources
(comparable to bidding on a business class upgrade).
VII. RELATED WORK
While auctions have been used in multiple domains,
e.g., [12]–[19], we are not aware of any directly related
work in this regard. Other approaches, e.g., [28], argue for
function placement in the fog based on global optimization;
later work by Rausch et al. [29] show through experiments
that centralized schedulers such as the Kubernetes scheduler
cannot handle the load necessary for function placement in a
fog-based FaaS. According to the authors, there is currently
no solution which is able to handle such scheduling across
edge nodes and clouds.
Other approaches from mobile edge computing, e.g. [30],
[31] propose to use long-running services that are live migrated
upon user movement instead of provisioning small functions
when needed. While this is certainly an alternative, we believe
that it is not a particularly efficient use of scarce edge resources
as long-running services are likely to be idle most of the time
while still blocking resources.
Baresi and Medonca [24] propose independent FaaS plat-
form instances distributed over the fog which offload func-
tions to other instances when needed. They propose to place
functions based on current load and request requirements.
Unfortunately, the authors are not particularly clear about
how and where their system makes these function allocation
decisions: Apparently, requests are first routed to a regional
load balancer (comparable to our intermediary nodes) which
then distributes requests. It remains unclear whether there is
more than one regional load balancer and how the distribution
decision is actually made. In either case, sending a request
from the edge to an intermediary first before processing it at
the edge adds unnecessary latency.
Commercial solutions such as AWS Greengrass6 provide
capabilities to execute functions at the edge and link them to
the cloud. In contrast to our proposed approach, functions at
the edge and in the cloud need to be addressed in different
ways so that the choice of execution location is left to the
application developer.
Finally, there are a number of alternative strategies for
function placement as, e.g., described in a survey on offloading
techniques by Aazam et al. [32], in which quality of service
constraints are considered for identifying an “optimal” place-
ment [33], [34].
VIII. CONCLUSION
Serverless FaaS is a promising paradigm for fog environ-
ments. In practice, fog-based FaaS platforms have to schedule
the execution of functions across multiple geo-distributed
sites, especially when edge nodes are overloaded. Existing
approaches mostly argue for centralized placement decisions
which, however, do not scale [29].
In this position paper, we proposed to follow an auction-
based scheme in which application developers specify bids
for storing executables and executing functions across the fog.
This way, overloaded fog nodes can make local decisions about
function execution so that function placement is no longer
a scalability bottleneck. Furthermore, we showed through
simulation that our approach asserts that all requests are served
while maximizing revenue for overloaded nodes. We argue for
further research on intelligent agents and systems in this area.
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